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Business Lobbying as an Informational Public Good:
Can Tax Deductions for Lobbying Expenses
Promote Transparency?
Michael Halberstam and Stuart Lazar

ABSTRACT
In this article, we link a proposed tax reform with a substantive disclosure requirement to promote
the kind of ‘‘information subsidy’’ that serves the public interest, while mitigating—at least to some
extent—the distortion that may result from the imbalance of financial resources on the business side
and other institutional constraints identified in the literature. We argue that businesses that lobby should
be encouraged to disclose the information that serves as a basis for their positions by allowing business
taxpayers to deduct lobbying expenses, but only to the extent that the information subsidy that a taxpayer’s lobbying supplies in fact educates lawmakers on policy issues. In other words, business lobbying can
be considered to supply an informational public good only where such information is made available to
all participants in the legislative process through full and timely publication. It cannot be said to supply
an informational public good where it is inserted strategically into the legislative process at a time, and in
such manner, that excludes others from using the information to assess the merits of proposed legislation
or promote contrary interests.

widely accepted account of corporate and
business lobbying is that K-Street serves as

the Congress’s back office by supplying costly information and technical expertise to legislators.1 Legislators and their staff,2 lobbyists,3 social scientists,4
and other observers—both critical and supportive

Michael Halberstam is an associate professor at State University of New York (SUNY) Buffalo Law School in Buffalo,
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1
See generally, Richard L. Hall and Alan V. Deardorff, Lobbying as a Legislative Subsidy, 100 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 69, 69
(2006) (stating that ‘‘lobbying is primarily a form of legislative
subsidy—a matching grant of costly policy information, political intelligence, and labor to the enterprises of strategically
selected legislators,’’ and discussing literature); see also
Frank Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki,
David C. Kimball, and Beth C. Leech, Lobbying and
Public Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses and
Why 123 (2009).
2
See, e.g., The Policy Council, Changing Of The Guard:
2007 State Of The Industry For Lobbying And Advocacy 60–61 (2007) (more than two thirds of staffers surveyed

view lobbyists as either ‘‘necessary to the process,’’ as ‘‘collaborators,’’ or as ‘‘educators’’).
3
Bertram J. Levine, The Art of Lobbying: Building
Trust and Selling Policy 124–26 (2009); Nicholas W.
Allard, Lobbying Is An Honorable Profession: The Right To
Petition And The Competition To Be Right, 19 Stanford L.
& Policy Rev. 23, 43 (2008) (‘‘The most basic function of lobbyists is to educate legislators.’’); Thomas Sussman, Lobbying, Ethical, Though Not Bound By the Common Good, in 72
Woodstock Report (Dec. 2002), available at < http://www8
.georgetown.edu/centers/woodstock/resources/articles/TheEthics-of-Lobbying.html > .
4
Baumgartner, supra note 1, at 123; Hall and Deardorff, supra
note 1; David Austen-Smith, Interest Groups: Money, Information and Influence, in Perspectives on Public Choice: A
Handbook 314 (1997) (‘‘Lobbying is essentially an informational activity’’) (discussing literature).
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of lobbying practices5—generally agree that lobbying serves as a kind of legislative subsidy.6 On the
‘‘subsidy theory,’’ K-Street supplies critical information and resources that help decision makers in Congress understand and sort through complex policy
issues, advocate for (or against) bills,7 and oversee
the federal bureaucracy.8 As Thomas Sussman
remarks, ‘‘government has become sufficiently complex that, without the information lobbyists bring
to legislators, decision-making would be—at best—
poorly informed.’’9
While more nuanced interpretations prevail in
the descriptive and empirical political science literature,10 the view that ‘‘[l]obbying is essentially an
informational activity,’’11 has persistently reinforced
the idea that lobbying provides a public good by educating legislators about policy and the consequences
of legislation.12
In this article, we link a proposed tax reform
with a substantive disclosure requirement to promote the kind of ‘‘information subsidy’’ that serves

the public interest, while mitigating—at least to
some extent—the distortion that may result from
the imbalance of financial resources on the side of
big business and other institutional constraints identified in the literature. We argue that businesses
that lobby should be encouraged to disclose the information that serves as a basis for their positions by
allowing business taxpayers to deduct lobbying
expenses, but only to the extent that the information
subsidy that a taxpayer’s lobbying supplies in fact
educates lawmakers on policy issues.13 In other
words, business lobbying can be considered to supply an informational public good, only where such
information is made available to all participants
in the legislative process through full and timely
publication. It cannot be said to supply an informational public good, where it is inserted strategically
into the legislative process at a time, and in such
manner, that excludes others from using the information to assess the merits of proposed legislation
or promote contrary interests.14

5
See, e.g., statements by U.S. Representatives Martin T. Meehan (D-MA) and Rahm Emanuel (D-IL) praising Senator
Russ Feingold (D-WI) for introducing the Lobbying and Ethics
Reform Act, the Senate companion to the House Lobbying and
Ethics Reform Act introduced by Meehan and Emanuel: ‘‘K
Street lobbyists have become the full-service ‘‘back office’’ of
Congress. Whether arranging and funding lavish ‘‘fact-finding’’
trips, writing major legislation, or serving as an employment
agency, special interest lobbyists are omnipresent. Professional
lobbyists have grown in number and influence, and the laws
haven’t kept pace. Just as the McCain-Feingold-Shays-Meehan
campaign finance reform put distance between donors and
members of Congress, this legislation will do the same with
K Street lobbyists and members of Congress.’’; Lessig, Republic Lost 144 (2011) (Lobbyists on behalf of special interests do
not try to convince opponents, but instead work to solidify their
base and support the work of those representatives who already
support their views to better advance them).
6
Hall and Deardorff, supra note 1.
7
Id. See also, Allard, supra note 3, at 43–44.
8
David Epstein and Sharon O’Halloran, A Theory of Strategic
Oversight: Congress, Lobbyists, and the Bureaucracy, 11 J.
L. & Econ. 227, 227 (1995).
9
Sussman, supra note 3; see also, Richard Briffault, The Anxiety of Influence: The Evolving Regulation of Lobbying, 13
Election L. J. 160–193 (2014).
10
Hall and Deardorff, supra note 1, at 80–81 (describing several
ways in which groups with large financial resources influence
agendas and skew the process in favor of their interests).
11Austen-Smith, supra note 4, at 314 (citing literature).
12
Infra notes 89, 116–124 and accompanying text.
13
We acknowledge the common wisdom that, allowing a deduction for certain lobbying expenditures, may exacerbate the

inequality between the ‘‘have’’ and ‘‘have nots’’ (i.e., the businesses that have large financial resources to allocate to the
political process versus individuals and nonprofit organizations
that do not have the same amounts to devote to arguing for their
position. However, we do not argue that allowing business taxpayers to deduct these expenditures will increase (or decrease)
the amount of lobbying that will occur. Rather, we believe that
our proposal may have the effect of shifting the type of activities conducted by businesses from ‘‘bad’’ lobbying (i.e., that
lobbying that occurs in back rooms and that provides legislators
with information not available for public inspection) with
‘‘good’’ lobbying (i.e., information made available to the public
that provides a common good and that allows those on the
opposite side of an issue to evaluate and comment on the data
and claims made by their adversaries). See infra note 113 and
accompanying text. In addition, we note that, since the enactment of the reforms to Section 162(e) of the Internal Revenue
Code made in 1993 to eliminate the lobbying deduction
which had, as one of its purposes, the reduction of the power
of special interest groups, the amount spent on lobbying activities have increased significantly.
14
In other words, to the extent that the usefulness of information
to the private sponsor depends on keeping it secret, or timing its
release strategically, that information should not be viewed as a
public good of the kind we should want to encourage. See
Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed
Interests And The Mobilization Of Bias In Congressional Committees, 84 The Am. Polit. Sci. Rev. 797, 801 (Sept. 1990) for
the proposition that special interests strategically focus on the
committee stage where the process is often informal and subject
to less scrutiny. ‘‘Indeed, a long tradition of research on subgovernments emphasizes that such clientism flourishes at the committee stage.’’ Id.
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Currently lobbying communications are not publicized. We, therefore, call for the development of a
third-generation online transparency mechanism15
to address the information asymmetries that characterize current institutions of congressional lobbying.16 Systems for disclosing the content of the
information transmitted to legislators online have
already been proposed17 and worked out in some
detail.18 This article takes a first, incremental step
towards establishing such disclosure as a routine
practice, by incentivizing it with a specific, limited
change to the Internal Revenue Code.
We suggest that deductions for certain business
lobbying expenses be reinstated by returning to a
formulation of Section 162(e) of the Internal Revenue Code similar to that which was in place from
1963 until 1993.19 The article argues that the current
version of Section 162(e) runs counter to normative tax policy, and fails to appreciate the important
role of lobbyists in satisfying legislative information sourcing in situations where the information
they create or acquire can add to the public debate.
Moreover, the current version of Section 162(e) may,

contrary to the executive’s intent at the time of its
passage, have unwittingly skewed federal lobbying
further in favor of large business interests and
encouraged political spending by corporations.20
We argue that businesses that provide information
to Congress in an open forum should be entitled to
deduct (for tax purposes) the cost of providing that
information as an ordinary and necessary business
expense. However, the deduction should be conditioned on timely disclosure of the substantive data
and policy analysis to a searchable database in standardized formats that is publicly accessible on the
web. This database could be managed by the Library
of Congress, which currently manages the much
more limited THOMAS public information system.21
We preface our discussion with several disclaimers. First, while our focus in this article is on the
nature of the information subsidy that lobbying
provides to the Congress, we do not privilege this
account of lobbying over all other accounts. We agree
with academics22 and practitioners,23 who point out
that lobbying serves different functions at different
times with different players.24

15
We use the term ‘‘third-generation transparency’’ in the
sense developed by Fung et al. Archon Fung, Mary
Graham, and David Weil, Full Disclosure: The
Perils and Promise of Transparency (2007). See Michael Halberstam, Process Failure and Transparency Reform
in Local Redistricting, 11 Elect. L. J. 446, 466–449 (2012)
(discussing the theory and its application in the redistricting
context).
16
The legislature is typically viewed as an institution that is separate from lobbying, even as it is recognized that lobbying is a
service that is integrated into the day-to-day ‘‘production of legislation.’’ Gregory Wawro, Legislative Entrepreneurship In The U.S. House Of Representatives 3 (2003).
We here treat the legislator and outside lobbyists as part of
the same institution.
17
See, e.g., Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Yoav Hammer, Lobbying
and the Democratic Process, Wm. and Mary Pol’y Rev.,
Vol. 2, No. 265, 2011 (calling for online disclosure of all written
information provided to legislators). Currently, the Lobbying
Disclosure Act, as amended by the Honest Leadership and
Open Government Act of 2007, only requires that lobbyists,
who are required to register, file disclosures of their financial
activity, their clients, their campaign contributions, and the
bills they lobbied on.
18
See, e.g., Lee Drutman’s outstanding proposal for a new
online public forum for lobbyists, constituents, and other interested parties to publicly and transparently debate legislation
that would be managed by the Library of Congress and provide
congressional staff, journalists, and the public access to the best
available arguments, information, and ideas about public policy
in connection with the introduction of each piece of legislation.
A Better Way to Fix Lobbying, 40 Issues In Governance

Studies 1 ( June 2011) (published by the Brookings Institution).
19
Unless otherwise provided, as used herein all references to
the Code or to a section of the Code refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. All references to the Regulations or to the Treasury Regulations refer to Treasury
Regulations promulgated thereunder.
20
See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
21
See infra notes 147–149 and accompanying text.
22
See, e.g., Timothy Lapira’s discussion of the literature, Is It
Who Says It, Or What They Say? Information Processing And
Lobbying Influence In Congress 4–8 (Dissertation, State Univ.
of N.J., Rutgers, 2008) (noting that ‘‘interest group research
has traditionally approached the subject of lobbying with the
assumption that groups indeed provide valuable information
to politicians, but has varied in its emphasis on the theoretical
nature and ultimate purpose of that information,’’ and distinguishing three categories of theories ‘‘exchange, framing, and
informational’’).
23
We thank Craig Holman and Nick Allard for asking us to clarify our position in this regard.
24
We do not infer from Hall and Deardorff’s information subsidy theory that all, or even a large part, of the information lobbying provides to Congress is a public good. We argue, instead,
that those who claim lobbying provides an informational public
good (which Hall and Deardorff themselves do not) must, upon
reflection, recognize that the current channels of information
transmission cannot support this claim. In other words, we
believe that, whatever position commentators take with respect
to the value of information provided through the lobbying process, public information is better than information conveyed in
secret.
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Moreover, with regard to the tax subsidy, our
claim is not that the non-deductibility of lobbying
expenses deters big businesses from providing
substantive information to Congress or to the public, but that allowing a deduction for such expenditures could incentivize business taxpayers to
publicize information that is currently exchanged
behind closed doors in ways that are useful for
public deliberation and the legislative process.25
On the other hand, we do suggest that the changes
made to Section 162(e) in 1993, which deny a
deduction for all lobbying communications (as
such term is defined in the Code), may have
affected the ability of small businesses to lobby
Congress.
Additionally, we recognize that incentivizing
substantive disclosure will not solve all of the problems associated with lobbying and the legislative
process. For example, the control that lobbyists
can exert over legally unlimited election spending
by their large business clients in a post-Citizens
United era is, in many ways, far more troubling
than business lobbying expenditures in and of
themselves.26 The benefits of substantive lobbying
disclosure that we advocate may not make much
of a difference in curing distortions of the lobbying process unless corporate political spending
is reigned in.27 Moreover, even if corporate (and
union) political spending is reigned in, the ‘‘gift
economy,’’ in which lawmakers provide privileged
access to those citizens, businesses, and their lobbyists in exchange for contributions to legislators’
reelection campaigns, or for routinely paying for
expensive lunches and dinners, continues to ensure
that the system does not provide equal access to
all.28 We address these problems here only insofar
as we seek to distinguish between direct lobbying
expenditures and political spending—a distinction
that the 1993 amendments to Section 162(e) have
undercut.29
Furthermore, we acknowledge that lobbyists
do much more than provide information to Congress. They keep clients informed about legislative and regulatory developments, engage in
administrative lobbying, pursue grassroots lobbying efforts, and much more.30 Our analysis is
restricted to direct lobbying of Congress, and only
one problem of the information exchange that takes
place.
Finally, we note that this article contributes to
a long and complicated debate regarding the cor-
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rect mechanism to open up the process of information sourcing by Congress, including proposals to
publish the reports created by the Congressional
Research Service (which are secret by default),31
calls for close to real-time publication of all information about all bills at each stage in the legislative
process,32 and attempts to force legislators back
into their offices on Capitol Hill by eliminating
free lunches and other boondoggles that rendered
them inaccessible to those without the financial

25

In other words, taking the deduction is voluntary, but requires
additional steps to comply with the transparency regulation.
Our proposal thus advances a change in the current ‘‘choice
architecture’’ that lumps legislative lobbying together with
grassroots lobbying and political spending from the perspective
of the taxpayer. Richard H. Thaler amd Cass R. Sunstein,
Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth,
and Happiness (2008).
26
See Craig Holman, The Tension Between Lobbying and Campaign Finance Laws: Rolling Back Gains Made Under the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, 13 Elect.
L. J. 45–74 (2014) describing the damage the Supreme Court’s
decision in Citizens’ United v. Federal Election Commission,
558 U.S. 310 (2010) to the gains made by the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007; Tolchin and Tolchin, Pinstripe Patronage: Political Favoritism From
the Clubhouse to the White House and Beyond 89
(2010) (‘‘Lobbyists and members of Congress often become
tied to each other through relationships based on mutual favors.
These ties have become much stronger in recent years as election ‘reform’ necessitates more and more fundraising interdependence’’).
27
The extent of involvement that some corporations have in
elections at the federal, state, and local level is described in
Town in Iowa Discovers There Is No Election Too Small For
Big Political Groups Seeking Influence, Washington Post
(Oct. 31, 2013) available at < http://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/iowa-town-discovers-that-no-election-is-too-small-forbig-political-groups-seeking-influence/2013/10/31/30ba7ab84247-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html > .
28
See Lessig, supra note 5, at 142ff and 166ff (2012) (discussing the literature); Clayton D. Peoples, Contributor Influence
in Congress: Social Ties and PAC Effects on U.S. House Policymaking, 51 Sociological Quart. 649 (2010).
29
But we leave a full motivation of this distinction to a separate
article.
30
See Allard, supra note 3, at 46.
31
See, e.g., H.Res. 110: Congressional Research Service Electronic Accessibility Resolution of 2013 introduced by Rep.
Leonard Lance.
32
GovTrack.us, run by Josh Tauberer, now scours many different government websites to compile much more information
about bills and the legislative process than the Library of Congress’s Thomas system provides. See, e.g., Joshua Tauberer,
Case Study: GovTrack.us in Timothy O’Reilly, Et. Al.,
Open Government 201 (2010).
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resources to participate in the pay-to-play process.33
We believe, however, that our article breaks new
ground by (1) recognizing that lobbying information
does not provide a public good unless published, and
(2) introducing a mechanism to promote transparency
in the legislative process by incentivizing lobbyists to
disclose publicly information that legislators have
consistently used (though not revealed) in making
legislative decisions.
Part II describes the current tax treatment for lobbying expenses, specifically Section 162(e), which
denies a deduction of direct lobbying expenses.
Part III describes the evolution of Section 162(e),
which has morphed, over time, from the position
under common law that no lobbying expenses
should be deductible, to the version in effect from
1963 until 1993 that allowed a deduction for certain
direct lobbying expenses, to the revised version
enacted in 1993 that scaled back the deductibility
of these expenditures. Part IV critically examines
the arguments that support the current version of
Section 162(e) from a tax perspective. Part V considers the claim that lobbying provides an informational public good in greater detail and specifies
how generally recognized information asymmetries
and strategic uses of lobbying information detract
from the legislative process. Part VI explores our
proposal in greater depth. The article concludes
with Part VII.

II. INTRODUCTION TO THE TAX
PROVISION
Section 162(a) provides taxpayers (including large
corporations) with a deduction for ‘‘ordinary and
necessary’’ expenses paid or incurred in carrying
on a trade or business. In other words, a business
is entitled to reduce its revenue by the expenses it
incurs to generate that revenue in determining taxable income. Lobbying and political expenditures,
however, currently are not deductible. Section
162(e)(1) provides, in full:
(e) Denial of deduction for certain lobbying
and political expenditures
(1) In general
No deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any amount paid or incurred in
connection with—
(A) influencing legislation,
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(B) participation in, or intervention in, any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office,
(C) any attempt to influence the general public, or segments thereof, with respect to elections, legislative matters, or referendums, or
(D) any direct communication with a covered
executive branch official in an attempt to
influence the official actions or positions of
such official.
We emphasize that, in this article, we only propose an amendment to Section 162(e)(1)(A), regarding the denial of a deduction for ‘‘influencing
legislation,’’ but do not consider any of the other disallowances.
A. Scope
There is no single definition in the law for the
term ‘‘lobbying.’’34 For purposes of disallowing a
business expense deduction, the term ‘‘lobbying’’
includes ‘‘influencing legislation,’’ which is defined
in the statute as ‘‘any attempt to influence legislation through communication with any member or
employee of a legislative body, or with any government official or employee who may participate in
the formulation of legislation.’’35 Moreover, any
amounts paid or incurred for research for, or preparation, planning, or coordination of, any of these
activities is treated as a lobbying activity, and also
is disallowed as a deduction.36 The regulations provide that influencing legislation means: (A) any
attempt to influence any legislation through a
lobbying communication, and (B) all activities, such
33

The Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007,
Pub. L. No. 110–81, 121 Stat. 735, enacted September 14,
2007, prohibited gifts, free lunches, transportation, and other
benefits conferred on legislators in Congress by lobbyists. Holman, see supra note 26.
34
See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This ‘‘Lobbying’’ That We
Are All So Worried About?, 26 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 485,
487–488 (2008).
35
I.R.C. x 162(e)(4)(A). For these purposes, the term ‘‘legislation’’ includes action with respect to Acts, bills, resolutions,
or similar items by the Congress, any State legislature, any
local council, or similar governing body, or by the public in a
referendum, initiative, constitutional amendment, or similar
procedure. I.R.C. x 4911(e)(2).
36
I.R.C. x 162(e)(5)(C). In addition, Section 162(e) denies a
deduction for the portion of dues or similar amounts paid by
a taxpayer to a tax-exempt organization that is allocable to
the expenditures set forth in Section 162(e)(1). I.R.C.
x 162(e)(3).
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as research, preparation, planning and coordination, including deciding whether to make a lobbying
communication, engaged in for the purpose of making or supporting a lobbying communication, even
if it is not made.37 The regulations provide that an
attempt to influence any legislation through a lobbying communication is making a lobbying communication.38
For these purposes, a ‘‘lobbying communication’’ is a communication (other than any communication compelled by subpoena, or otherwise
compelled by federal or state law) with any member or employee of a legislative body or any other
government official or employee, who may participate in the formulation of the legislation, that does
either of the following: (A) the communication
refers to specific legislation and reflects a view
on that legislation; or (B) the communication clarifies, amplifies, modifies, or provides support for
views reflected in a prior lobbying communication.39 Specific legislation includes both pending
legislation and legislation that has not yet been
introduced.40
The language of the regulations is critical in
that it takes into account communications that
reflect the writer’s view on legislation in addition
to communications that either expressly support or
oppose that legislation. According to the preamble to the regulations, several commentators suggested that the regulations should distinguish
between influencing legislation and educating
legislators. In addition, some commentators suggested that presenting a balanced analysis of the
merits and defects of specific legislation should
not constitute reflecting a view on legislation.
However, neither recommendation was adopted
in the final regulations.41
By broadly defining the term ‘‘influencing legislation,’’ Treasury Regulations promulgated under
Section 162(e) disallow a deduction for much of
the industry information that might serve a public
good. The following examples, extracted from
these regulations, illustrate the scope of such
term:
Example 8. (i) Taxpayer Y represents citrus
fruit growers. Y writes a letter to a United
States senator discussing how pesticide O has
benefited citrus fruit growers and disputing
problems linked to its use. The letter discusses
a bill pending in Congress and states in part:

This bill would prohibit the use of pesticide O. If citrus growers are unable to use
this pesticide, their crop yields will be
severely reduced, leading to higher prices for consumers and lower profits,
even bankruptcy, for growers.
(ii) Y’s views on the bill are reflected in this
statement. Thus, the communication is a lobbying communication, and Y is influencing
legislation.42
Example 9. (i) B, the president of Taxpayer Z,
an insurance company, meets with Q, who
chairs the X state legislature’s committee with
jurisdiction over laws regulating insurance
companies, to discuss the possibility of legislation to address current problems with surplusline companies. B recommends that legislation
be introduced that would create minimum capital and surplus requirements for surplus-line
companies and create clearer guidelines concerning the risks that surplus-line companies
can insure. B’s discussion with Q is a lobbying
communication because B refers to and reflects
a view on a specific legislative proposal. Therefore, Z is influencing legislation.
(ii) Q is not convinced that the market for surplus-line companies is substantial enough to
warrant such legislation and requests that B
provide information on the amount and types
of risks covered by surplus-line companies.

37

Treas. Reg. x 1.162-29(b)(1) (as amended in 1995).
Treas. Reg. x 1.162-29(b)(2) (as amended in 1995).
39
Treas. Reg. x 1.162-29(b)(3) (as amended in 1995).
40
Treas. Reg. x 1.162-29(b)(5) (as amended in 1995). The regulations provide an example in which a taxpayer prepares a
paper asserting that a lack of new capital is hurting the national
economy. The paper indicates that lowering the capital gains
rate would increase the availability of capital and increase tax
receipts from the capital gains tax. The taxpayer forwards the
paper to representatives in Congress with a cover letter that,
in part, urges that those representatives support a reduction in
the capital gains tax rate. This communication is a lobbying
communication because it refers to and reflects a view on a specific legislative proposal (i.e., lowering the capital gains rate).
The example concludes that the taxpayer is influencing legislation even though there is no indication that Congress previously
had been considering any proposal with respect to the capital
gains rate. See Treas. Reg. 1.162-29(b)(7) (as amended in
1995), Ex. 5.
41
T.D. 8602, 60 Fed. Reg. 37,568 ( July 21, 1995).
42
Treas. Reg. 1.162-29(b)(7) (as amended in 1995), Ex. 8. The
conclusion of this example is that Y’s expenses in preparing the
communication would not be deductible for tax purposes.
38
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After the meeting, B has employees of Z prepare estimates of the percentage of property
and casualty insurance risks handled by surplus-line companies. B sends the estimates
with a cover letter that simply refers to the
enclosed materials. Although B’s follow-up
letter to Q does not refer to specific legislation
or reflect a view on such legislation, B’s letter
supports the views reflected in the earlier communication. Therefore, the letter is a lobbying communication and Z is influencing
legislation.43
In both cases, one can certainly see the benefit to
the taxpayer that could result from the success of
its own lobbying efforts. But there is also a public
benefit to such information provided by the business taxpayer. Knowledge of markets, business
conditions, and the effects of government action
on thousands of different industries across the
country (with customers and production facilities
around the globe) are essential to the intelligent
regulation of markets.44 Those who believe in market regulation should be particularly concerned
that legislators have ready access to such independent information for purposes of legislation and
oversight.45
We acknowledge that information produced by
the type of lobbying described in Examples 8 and

43

Treas. Reg. 1.162-29(b)(7) (as amended in 1995), Ex. 9. Again,
the conclusion of this example is that Z’s expenses in preparing
the communication would not be deductible for tax purposes.
44
See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Information and the Change in
Paradigm in Economics in Selected Works Of Joseph Stiglitz, Vol. I 53, 62ff (2009) (criticizing the standard, competitive, general equilibrium approach to market failure, because it
did not account ‘‘for the myriad information problems faced by
consumers and firms every day.’’).
45
By ‘‘independent’’ we here mean independent of the executive and administrative agencies. As the ABA Taskforce on Federal Lobbying Laws notes, ‘‘[t]he government—whether it be
the executive or the legislative branch—simply cannot know
the intricate details of the myriad aspects of national life that
its actions might affect unless it has access to the expert contributions of the persons and interests involved.’’ Lobbying Law in
the Spotlight: Challenges and Proposed Improvements, available at < http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
2011_build/administrative_law/lobbying_task_force_report_
010311.authcheckdam.pdf > .
46
While committee chairs, committee staff, and policy experts
among legislators may have access to information on both
sides of an issue, other legislators, not as well versed in that policy area, may only see information that is publicly disclosed in a
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9, above, may be self-serving. But this suggests all
the more that routine publication should be encouraged. Legislators presently already rely on information
provided by lobbyists. By bringing this information
to light, state and local governments, the press,
sophisticated intermediaries, and the public—who
may be on the other side of an issue—are empowered
to participate in fact-checking, interpreting, and counterbalancing one-sided information. Moreover, by
publishing lobbying communications, the judgment
as to how some piece of information communicated
privately to a committee chair or staffer should be
interpreted, or whether it should become part of the
debate at all, is not left to the judgment of individual
legislators themselves. 46
B. Justification
The non-deductibility provisions of Section
162(e) have been justified on a number of grounds.
First, lobbying expenditures are not sufficiently
related to a business’s survival and profitability to
fall within the ‘‘ordinary and necessary’’ requirement of Section 162.47 Second, in an attempt to
achieve ‘‘tax neutrality’’48 with respect to lobbying
and political expenditures, business taxpayers
should not be entitled to a tax benefit (i.e. the deduction) not available to non-business taxpayers.49
Finally, non-deductibility reflects a public policy

timely fashion. By incentivizing the release of additional public
information, these legislators may become more informed
about more issues upon which they cast votes. See notes 139–
144 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Robert G. Kaiser,
Act of Congress: How America’s Essential Institution
Works, and How It Doesn’t (2013) (describing how important decisions on mark-up were sometimes conducted by committee staff without input by legislators).
47
See, infra, Part III. See also Comment, Deducting Business
Expenses Designed to Influence Governmental Policy as
‘‘Ordinary and Necessary’’: Cammarano v. United States and
a Bit Beyond, 69 Yale L.J. 1017, 1028 (1960).
48
One commentator expressed the view that the ‘‘no subsidy of
lobbying’’ rationale might express one of three different concerns of tax neutrality: (1) the government should not be both
an encourager and recipient of lobbying (judicial neutrality),
(2) these lobbying deductions are discriminatory because they
are worth more to wealthier taxpayers (wealth neutrality), and
(3) all taxpayers, especially those who cannot obtain lobbying
deductions, should be treated equally (deduction neutrality).
See Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Tax Policy, Social Policy, and
Politics: Amending Section 162(e), 61 Tax Notes 595, 604
(Nov. 1, 1993).
49
Cammarano v. U.S., 353 U.S. 498 (1959).
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concern embodied in many state laws prohibiting
corporate spending for political purposes.50 Tax
consequences, it is urged, must not frustrate sharply
defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct.51
As we discuss in Part IV, each of these arguments
is problematic—either from a pure tax standpoint,
or from a larger public policy standpoint.
C. The local exception
Section 162(e) also contains a surprising exception. While lobbying at the federal and state legislative levels are non-deductible, Section 162(e)(2)
makes an exception ‘‘in the case of any legislation
of any local council or similar governing body.’’
For local government lobbying, the relevant provision does allow the deduction of:
all ordinary and necessary expenses (including, but not limited to, traveling expenses
described in subsection (a)(2) and the cost of
preparing testimony) paid or incurred during
the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business—
(i) in direct connection with appearances
before, submission of statements to, or sending communications to the committees, or
individual members, of such council or body
with respect to legislation or proposed legislation of direct interest to the taxpayer, or
(ii) in direct connection with communication of
information between the taxpayer and an organization of which the taxpayer is a member
with respect to any such legislation or proposed
legislation which is of direct interest to the taxpayer and to such organization.52
In other words, ordinary and necessary expenses
incurred in connection with direct (not grass roots)
local legislative communications, or communications regarding local legislative matters between a
taxpayer and a trade association of which the taxpayer is a member, are deductible.53
This exception is truly puzzling. Indeed, leaving
aside that this deduction is available to small businesses as well—the ‘‘local exception’’ could look
like a federal subsidy to large corporations for influencing local legislation—if you accept the argument that a tax deduction constitutes a ‘‘subsidy.’’54
Multi-national corporations can already bring
overwhelming lobbying resources to bear against

resistance to their plans at the local legislative
level. Moreover, their bargaining position for tax
deductions with municipalities is already lopsided,
in that municipalities cannot afford to lose jobs
and must attract new industry. If anything, the
Code should not further encourage outside influence at the local level by big business.
So what explains the disallowance under Section
162(e)(1)(A) and the ‘‘local exception’’ under Section 162(e)(2)? As we shall see, the local exception
is primarily a survival from the original 1963 statute
that, for the first time, explicitly allowed for the
deductibility of direct lobbying expenses at all levels of government.

III. PATH DEPENDENCE, POLITICS,
AND POLICY
The history of Section 162(e) represents a fractious debate on the issue, and several policy
changes, with a persistent bias against allowing
businesses to expense their lobbying costs.

50

With the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens’ United, this
picture has become slightly more complicated. We acknowledge that, by allowing businesses to deduct expenditures for
certain lobbying expenses, there is the possibility that businesses will have a greater incentive to devote resources towards
lobbying. However, there is no evidence that the reforms to Section 162(e) that disallowed a deduction for all lobbying expenditures had any effect in reducing the amount spent by business
on lobbying activities. Conversely, we do not believe that allowing a deduction for lobbying activities will increase the extent
that businesses lobby their positions. Instead, we argue that,
on the question of deductibility, the issue of salience arises in
the types of lobbying activities conducted. We believe that
there is a low degree of correlation between the amount of lobbying and the availability of a tax deduction for lobbying.
Rather, we believe that allowing a business expense deduction
for certain types of lobbying, while continuing to disallow a
deduction for other types of lobbying, will incentivize those
businesses active in the lobbying process to change their behavior by disclosing information previously provided to legislators
(and used in making voting decisions) in camera because of the
added tax benefits.
51
Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943) (legal
expenses incurred in resisting issuance by Postmaster General
of fraud order accorded deductibility). See Cammarano v.
United States, 358 U.S. 498, 508 (1959); Tank Truck Rentals,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33–34 (1958); Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 94–97 (1952).
52
I.R.C. x 162(e)(2).
53
I.R.C. x 162(e).
54
See, generally, Theodore Seto, Keeping Tax-Subsidized Corporate Money Out Of Politics, 127 Tax Notes 1476 ( June 28,
2010).
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A. The U.S. Treasury’s disallowance and the
interpretation of the judiciary: Pre-1963 views
of the deduction for lobbying expenditures
Prior to 1962, the general rule was that expenses
to influence legislation were not deductible. Jasper
Cummings has argued that disallowance was the
result of long-standing judicial disfavor of certain
types of lobbying activities.55 Thus, in Trist v.
Child (1874), the Supreme Court refused to enforce
a contract for payment for lobbying services on
grounds that the contract violated public policy.56
The Supreme Court’s language reflects the profound distaste with which much of the federal judiciary has regarded lobbying throughout most of
modern American history. The Trist Court stated:
The agreement in the present case was for the
sale of the influence and exertions of the lobby
agent to bring about the passage of a law for
the payment of a private claim, without reference to its merits, by means which, if not corrupt, were illegitimate, and considered in
connection with the pecuniary interest of the

55

See Cummings, supra note 48, at 605–607.
88U.S. 441 (1874).
57
Id. at 451–452. The Court continued:
56

If the instances were numerous, open, and tolerated,
they would be regarded as measuring the decay of the
public morals and the degeneracy of the times. No
prophetic spirit would be needed to foretell the consequences near at hand. The same thing in lesser legislation, if not so prolific of alarming evils, is not less
vicious in itself, nor less to be condemned. The vital
principle of both is the same. The evils of the latter
are of sufficient magnitude to invite the most serious
consideration. The prohibition of the law rests upon a
solid foundation. A private bill is apt to attract little
attention. It involves no great public interest, and usually fails to excite much discussion. Not unfrequently
the facts are whispered to those whose duty it is to
investigate, vouched for by them, and the passage of
the measure is thus secured. If the agent is truthful,
and conceals nothing, all is well. If he uses nefarious
means with success, the spring-head and the stream of
legislation are polluted. To legalize the traffic of such
service, would open a door at which fraud and falsehood would not fail to enter and make themselves felt
at every accessible point. It would invite their presence
and offer them a premium. If the tempted agent be corrupt himself, and disposed to corrupt others, the transition requires but a single step. He has the means in his
hands, with every facility and a strong incentive to use
them. The widespread suspicion which prevails, and
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agent at stake, contrary to the plainest principles of public policy. No one has a right, in
such circumstances, to put himself in a position of temptation to do what is regarded as
so pernicious in its character. The law forbids
the inchoate step, and puts the seal of its reprobation upon the undertaking.
If any of the great corporations of the country
were to hire adventurers who make market of
themselves in this way, to procure the passage
of a general law with a view to the promotion of their private interests, the moral sense
of every right-minded man would instinctively denounce the employer and employed
as steeped in corruption, and the employment
as infamous.57
For federal income tax purposes, non-deductibility
of lobbying expenses began early in the process.
The corporate income tax was enacted in 1909,
the individual income tax in 1913, and, by, 1915,
the Treasury Department had issued an administrative ruling concluding that lobbying expenditures
‘‘are held not to be ordinary and necessary expenses

charges openly made and hardly denied, lead to the conclusion that such events are not of rare occurrence.
Where the avarice of the agent is inflamed by the
hope of a reward contingent upon success, and to be
graduated by a percentage upon the amount appropriated, the danger of tampering in its worst form is greatly
increased.
It is by reason of these things that the law is as it is
upon the subject. It will not allow either party to be
led into temptation where the thing to be guarded
against is so deleterious to private morals and so injurious to the public welfare. In expressing these views, we
follow the lead of reason and authority.
We are aware of no case in English or American jurisprudence like the one here under consideration, where the
agreement has not been adjudged to be illegal and void.
We have said that for professional services in this connection a just compensation, may be recovered. But where
they are blended and confused with those which are forbidden, the whole is a unit and indivisible. That which is
bad destroys that which is good, and they perish together.
Services of the latter character, gratuitously rendered, are
not unlawful. The absence of motive to wrong is the foundation of the sanction. The tendency to mischief, if not
wanting, is greatly lessened. The taint lies in the stipulation for pay. Where that exists, it affects fatally, in all its
parts, the entire body of the contract. In all such cases, protior conditio defendentis. Where there is turpitude, the law
will help neither party.
Id. at 451–452.
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in the operation and maintenance of the business of
a corporation and are therefore not deductible.’’58 In
1918, also relying on the ‘‘ordinary and necessary’’
requirement to the predecessor to Section 162, the
Treasury Department enacted a regulation denying
a deduction for lobbying expenditures.59
Even as Treasury denied a deduction for lobbying
activities, during the 1920s and 1930s, the Board of
Tax Appeals (i.e., the predecessor to the Tax Court),
nonetheless, frequently allowed taxpayers to deduct
the costs of lobbying on a case-by-case basis. The
Board has been described as a ‘‘formidable foe’’
to the Treasury’s policy during this period.60
According to Professor Sharp, ‘‘[t]o avoid the obligatory application of the regulation, that tribunal
chose a singular approach. The Board considered
the facts in each particular case and reached its conclusion solely by determining whether or not the
expenditures were in fact ordinary and necessary.’’61
The Supreme Court first considered the Treasury
Regulations in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v.
Commissioner (1941).62 That case involved a taxpayer who represented German textile interests in
an effort to obtain legislation regarding properties

seized during World War I.63 The taxpayer deducted
expenses incurred in lobbying Congress to pass
such legislation. The government, on audit, denied
these deductions. In the absence of a statutory provision explicitly governing the deductibility of lobbying expenditures, the Court’s decision hinged on
Treasury’s interpretation of the phrase ‘‘ordinary
and necessary’’ business expenses. The taxpayer
challenged Treasury’s interpretation, maintaining
that his lobbying expenses were, in fact, ‘‘ordinary
and necessary.’’ In an opinion authored by Justice
Douglas—whose expertise in corporate finance
and administrative law was beyond challenge64—
the Court upheld the Treasury Department’s regulations by construing Congress’s delegation of
powers broadly, stating that ‘‘[t]he words ‘ordinary
and necessary’ are not so clear and unambiguous in
their meaning and application as to leave no room
for an interpretative regulation.’’65 The Court found
that the Treasury Department had not ‘‘usurped the
legislative function by carving out this special
group of expenses and making them non-deductible.’’ Moreover, the Court reasoned, ‘‘[s]uch a
course did not contravene any Congressional policy.

58

the statute was sufficiently ambiguous and that, because
Congress had re-enacted the statute with the knowledge of
the regulation [denying a deduction for lobbying expenses],
such re-enactment was an implicit blessing that ‘‘the regulation was not inconsistent with the intent of the statute.’’ Id.,
citing Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United States,
288U.S. 269, 273, 53 S.Ct. 337, 339, 77 L.Ed. 739. The
Board of Tax Appeals rejected the Ninth Circuit’s view
and continued to deny the obligatory application of the regulations. See Sharp at 368, n. 22, citing William P. Kyne, 35
B.T.A. 202 (1936); Lelia S. Kirby, 35 B.T.A. 578 (1936); H.
R. Cullen, 41 B.T.A. 1054 (1940).
62
314U.S. 327 (1941).
63
In this case, the taxpayer’s compensation for these services
was contingent, and the taxpayer bore all of its own expenses
including the costs of lobbying (within the meaning of the regulations) on behalf of its clients. In its decision, the Court
addressed two arguments by the taxpayer. First, that the regulations were inapplicable to deny a business expense for lobbying
expenditures because the regulations were incorporated into the
charitable deduction section for individuals rather than the business expense deduction provisions. The Court held that, based
on the history of the regulations, the fact that such regulations
were not incorporated under the correct provision was ‘‘frivolous.’’ Id. at 338. The Court also held that the taxpayer’s second
argument, that the regulations were invalid, also lacked substance. Id.
64
Douglas was drafted by Roosevelt to build the new Securities
Exchange Commission in the 1930s.
65
Id.

See T.D. 2137, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 57, 57–58 (1915).
Treas. Reg. x 33, art. 143 (1918), reprinted in 132 Internal
Revenue Acts of the United States, 1909–1950: Legislative Histories, Laws, and Administrative Documents 75 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979). The
regulation, promulgated under the charitable contributable
deduction provisions, provided that: ‘‘Corporations are not
entitled to deduct from gross income contributions or gifts
which individuals may deduct under section 23(n). Donations
made by a corporation for purposes connected with the operation of its business, however, when limited to charitable
institutions, hospitals, or educational institutions conducted
for the benefit of its employees or their dependents are a
proper deduction as ordinary and necessary expenses. Donations which legitimately represent a consideration for a benefit flowing directly to the corporation as an incident of its
business are allowable deductions from gross income.Sums
of money expended for lobbying purposes, the promotion or
defeat of legislation, the exploitation of propaganda, including advertising other than trade advertising, and contributions for campaign expenses, are not deductible from gross
income (emphasis added).’’
60
See generally Dean E. Sharp, Reflection on the Disallowance
of Income Tax Deductions for Lobbying Expenditures, 39 B.U.
L. Rev. 365, 367–8 (1959).
61
Id. at 367–368, n. 15 and 16. The Board of Tax Appeals
first reversal came in the Ninth Circuit with Sunset Scavenger Co. v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 453 (9th Cir. 1936),
rev’g. 31 B.T.A. 758 (1934). In that case, the court concluded that the term ‘‘ordinary and necessary’’ as used in
59
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Contracts to spread such insidious influences through
legislative halls have long been condemned.’’66
In 1959, the Supreme Court upheld essentially
the same Treasury regulation in Cammarano v.
U.S.67 In Cammarano, the taxpayers68 deducted
amounts paid to trade associations for grassroots
lobbying to defeat proposed state ballot initiative
measures [in Washington State and Arkansas]
which would have changed the manner in which
alcohol was sold in their states, significantly affecting the taxpayers’ businesses. The Court saw no
merit in limiting the holding in Textile Mills to
direct dealings with legislators, finding that the definition of lobbying includes ‘‘publicity directed to
the general public on legislative matters.’’69 The
Court stated ‘‘[w]e think that initiatives are plainly
‘legislation’ within the meaning of these Regulations. Had the measures involved in these cases

66

Id. Interestingly, Textile Mills was decided on December 8,
1941—the day after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, signifying the point at which the United States entered World War II.
It is hard to believe that the decision could have been decided
any other way in light of the historical events affecting the
nation at this time.
Textile Mills was later cited by the Supreme Court in Tank
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356U.S. 30 (1958), for
the proposition that a deduction may be denied under Section
162 where such deduction would frustrate public policy. Tank
Truck Rentals was the basis for Congress’ later enactment of
Sections 162(c), (f), and (g). The legislative history to those
provisions state:
From the standpoint of tax policy, there generally has
been a reluctance to deny business expenses on the
ground that this departs from the concept of a tax
imposed on actual net business income.’’ There still
remains, however, the question as to what is an ordinary
and necessary business expense. The Supreme Court in
the Tank Truck Rental case, for example, in holding
that the payment of fines could not be considered as ordinary and necessary, stated:
A finding of ‘necessity’ cannot be made however,
if allowance of the deduction would frustrate
sharply defined national or State policies proscribing the particular types of conduct evidenced by
some governmental declaration thereof.
On the same grounds, it appears appropriate to deny deductions for bribes, illegal kickbacks, and the penalty portion
of antitrust treble damage payments. A 1958 amendment to
the Internal Revenue Code already suggests such a congressional policy. Under that amendment no deduction
may be taken for payments to officials or employees of a
foreign government if in the United States such payments
would be unlawful. In addition, deduction of expenditures
made to influence legislation are already limited by a spe-
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been passed by the people of Washington and
Arkansas they would have had the effect and status
of ordinary laws in every respect. The Constitutions
of the States of Washington and Arkansas both
explicitly recognize that in providing for initiatives
they are vesting legislative power in the people.’’ 70
The Court again addressed the validity of the
Treasury Regulations. The taxpayers argued that
their expenditures were necessary to preserve their
businesses, such amounts should be deductible as
ordinary and necessary business expenses under
the Code as a matter of law, and a regulation purporting to deny deductibility to such expenditures
is plainly contrary to the statute and ipso facto invalid.71 In affirming its holding in Textile Mills. The
court further limited its holding in Heininger,
which allowed a deduction for expenditures without
which a business enterprise would inevitably suffer

cific provision (sec. 162(e)) added by the Revenue Act of
1962.
Explanation of provision—The Provision added by the
committee amendments denies deductions of four types
of expenditures: fines or similar penalties paid to a government for the violation of any law, a portion of treble damage payments under the antitrust laws following a related
criminal conviction (or plea of equity or nolo contendere),
deductions for bribes paid to public officials (whether or
not foreign officials), and other unlawful bribes or ‘kickbacks.’ The provision for the denial of the deduction for
payments in these situations which are deemed to violate
public policy is intended to be all inclusive. Public policy,
in other circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly
defined to justify the disallowance of deductions. However,
this is not, of course, intended to affect the treatment of
lobbying expenditures which are already covered by the
tax law.
S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 274 (1969), 1969-3
C.B. 423, 596–597.
67
Cammarano v. U.S., 358U.S. 498 (1959).
68
Although jointly decided, this decision reflects two cases
brought to the Court presenting identical issues for appeal:
Cammarano v. U.S., 246F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1957) and F. Strauss
& Son, Inc., of Arkansas v. Commissioner, 251F.2d 724 (8th
Cir. 1958).
69
Id. at 505, citing e.g., Revere Racing Ass’n v. Scanlon,
232F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1956); American Hardware & Equipment
Co. v. Commissioner, 202F.2d 126 (4th. Cir. 1953); Roberts
Dairy Co. v. Commissioner, 195F.2d 948 (8th. Cir. 1952); Sunset Scavenger Co. v. Commissioner, 84F.2d 453 (9th. Cir 1936).
70
Id. at 505–06.
71
Id. at 507. The taxpayers relied on Commissioner v. Heininger, 320U.S. 467 (1943), in which the Court held that a dentist could deduct (as ordinary and necessary business expenses)
the cost of attorney’s fees paid to defend himself against mail
fraud charges that would have ended his business.
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adverse effects in situations where granting such
deduction would frustrate no ‘‘sharply defined national or state policies.’’72 However, in the case
of the grassroots lobbying expenditures at issue in
Cammarano, the Court noted that ‘‘[h]ere the deductions sought are prohibited by Regulations which
themselves constitute an expression of a sharply
defined national policy, further demonstration of
which may be found in other sections of the Internal
Revenue Code.’’73
The Court then cited to the history on the regulations, the large body of case law, and the
changes made to the Internal Revenue Code in
the intervening years. Based on the fact that
Congress re-enacted, without change, the term
‘‘ordinary and necessary’’ in the 1954 Code, the
Court concluded ‘‘[u]nder these circumstances
we think that the Regulations have acquired the
force of law.’’74
Finally, turning to the issue of tax neutrality,
the Court, citing Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in
Slee75 and amendments to the Code limiting the
ability of tax-exempt organizations to engage in
political or lobbying activities, attempted to illustrate that by denying the deduction at issue, all taxpayers must be treated equally with respect to these
expenditures. ‘‘Controversies of that sort must be
conducted without public subvention; the Treasury
stands aside from them.’’76 In other words, the
Court was refusing to allow the fisc to subsidize lob-

bying expenditures and to require their payment
with after-tax dollars.
In its opinion, the Court appears to combine this
with Cammarano’s argument that the limitation of a
tax deduction is the equivalent of a limitation of
their First Amendment rights.77 The Court rejected
this argument stating:

72

75

73

76

Id. at 508.
Id. In addition, citing to the re-enactment rule relied upon
by the Court in Textile Mills, the Court in Cammarano stated
that:
As was said in Textile Mills, ‘the words ‘ordinary and
necessary’ are not so clear and unambiguous in their
meaning and application as to leave no room for an interpretative regulation. The numerous cases which have
come to this Court on that issue bear witness to that.’
In the present cases there is before us regulatory language of more than 40 years’ continuous duration
expressly providing that sums expended for the activities
here involved shall not be considered an ordinary and
necessary business expense under the statute. The provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which underlie the
Regulations have been repeatedly re-enacted by the Congress without the slightest suggestion that the policy
expressed in these regulatory measures does other than
precisely conform to its intent.
Id. at 508–09.
Id. at 510–11.

74

Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they engage in constitutionally
protected activities, but are simply being
required to pay for those activities entirely
out of their own pockets, as everyone else
engaging in similar activities is required to
do under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. Nondiscriminatory denial of deduction from gross income to sums expended
to promote or defeat legislation is plainly
not ‘‘aimed at the suppression of dangerous
ideas.’’. Rather, it appears to us to express a
determination by Congress that since purchased publicity can influence the fate of
legislation which will affect, directly or indirectly, all in the community, everyone in the
community should stand on the same footing
as regards its purchase so far as the Treasury
of the United States is concerned.78
Following Cammarano, the Treasury Department
promulgated regulations that expanded the types of

Slee v. Commissioner, 42F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
Id. at 185.
77
Cammarano at 512.
78
Id. at 513. As discussed, infra, in Part IV, it is not clear that
denial of a tax deduction achieves tax neutrality as the Court in
Cammarano suggests. Because many of the benefits received
by non-business taxpayers from lobbying are not subject to tax,
the fact that their lobbying expenditures are non-deductible
achieves a certain parity. Charitable organizations receive public
subsidies through tax-deductible contributions, and may influence legislation—the provisions of the Code that prevent these
organizations from participating in the political process only
penalize these organizations when a substantial part of the total
activities of the organization are for the purpose of influencing
legislation. In other words, incidental (or non-substantial) activities are subsidized. Business taxpayers, however, are taxed on
their income, but are prohibited from deducting the lobbying
expenditures required to produce that income. This mismatching
of income and expense can be seen as placing business taxpayers
on a lower footing than non-business taxpayers.
But, see Supplemental and Minority Views of Senators Paul
Douglas and Albert Gore, 1962-3 C.B. 1092, 1116–1120.
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expenditures disallowed as deductions—including
expenditures for both direct and grassroots lobbying, and the disallowance of a deduction for a
portion of dues paid to a membership organization, a substantial part of the activities of which consisted of lobbying.79 The regulations issued by the
Treasury Department in 1959 raised many administrative and enforcement problems and uncertainties
for both the government and taxpayers.80 More
importantly, however, Congress became concerned
with the apparent incongruity between the treatment
of expenses for appearances before the different
branches of government.81 For example, expenses
incurred in appearing before legislative bodies or
before legislators were not deductible while appearances before executive or administrative officials
with respect to administrative matters, or before the

courts with respect to judicial matters, were deductible where the expenses otherwise qualify as trade or
business expenses.

79
T.D. 6435, 1960-1 C.B. 79, promulgated former Treas. Reg. x
1.162-15(c)(15), which provided:
x 1.162-15 Excepted Contributions. * * * (c) (1) Expenditures for lobbying purposes, for the promotion or
defeat of legislation, for political campaign purposes (including the support of or opposition to any candidate for
public office), or for carrying on propaganda (including
advertising) related to any of the foregoing purposes
are not deductible from gross income. For example, the
cost of advertising to promote or defeat legislation or
to influence the public with respect to the desirability
or undesirability of proposed legislation is not deductible
as a business expense, even though the legislation may
directly affect the taxpayer’s business. On the other
hand, expenditures for institutional or ‘‘good will’’ advertising which keeps the taxpayer’s name before the public
are generally deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses provided the expenditures are related to
the patronage the taxpayer might reasonably expect in
the future. For example, a deduction will ordinarily be
allowed for the cost of advertising which keeps the taxpayer’s name before the public in connection with
encouraging contributions to such organizations as the
Red Cross, the purchase of United States Savings
Bonds, or participation in similar causes. In like fashion,
expenditures for advertising which present views on economic, financial, social, or other subjects of a general
nature but which do not involve any of the activities specified in the first sentence of this subparagraph are deductible if they otherwise meet the requirements of the
regulations under section 162.
(2) Dues and other payments to an organization, such as a
labor union or a trade association, which otherwise meet
the requirements of the regulations under section 162,
are deductible in full unless a substantial part of the organization’s activities consists of one or more of those specified in the first sentence of subparagraph (1) of this

paragraph. If a substantial part of the activities of the organization consists of one or more of those so specified,
deduction will be allowed only for such portion of such
dues and other payments as the taxpayer can clearly establish is attributable to activities other than those so specified. The determination as to whether such specified
activities constitute a substantial part of an organization’s
activities shall be based on all the facts and circumstances.
In no event shall special assessments or similar payments
(including an increase in dues) made to any organization
for any of such specified purposes be deductible.
(3) Expenditures for the promotion or the defeat of legislation include, but shall not be limited to, expenditures for
the purpose of attempting to—

B. The enactment of Section 162(e) in 1963:
Congress steps in
As part of the Revenue Act of 1962,82 Congress
addressed these issues for the first time by enacting
Section 162(e), which provided for a deduction for
expenses associated with direct lobbying activities
incurred by business taxpayers.83
Section 162(e), as enacted in 1963, provided
that a taxpayer could deduct all of its ordinary and
necessary direct lobbying expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business.84 Specifically, Section 162(e) defined these

(i) Influence members of a legislative body directly or
indirectly, by urging or encouraging the public to contact such members for the purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation, or
(ii) Influence the public to approve or reject a measure in
a referendum, initiative, vote on a constitutional
amendment, or similar procedure.
80

H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 402, 421. These problems included the difficulty in determining whether an expense is deductible in
general; how to isolate expenses related to legislative matters;
in segregating and classifying expenses; in detailed recordkeeping related to such expenditures; and in determining whether
such expenses are substantial.
81
H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 402, 421; S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 22 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 703, 728.
82
Pub. L. 87-834.
83
H.R. Rep. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 402, 421; S. Rep. No. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 22 (1962), reprinted in 1962-3 C.B. 703, 728.
84
I.R.C. x 162(e)(1)(A).
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direct lobbying expenditures as the taxpayer’s (1)
expenses in direct connection with appearances
before, submission of statements to, or sending
communications to, the committees, or individual
members, of federal, state, or local legislative bodies with respect to legislation or proposed legislation of direct interest to the taxpayer, (2) expenses
in direct connection with communication of information between the taxpayer and an organization
of which he is a member with respect to legislation
or proposed legislation of direct interest to the taxpayer and to such organization. This language is, of
course, identical to the language of the local exception that previously appeared so puzzling.85
In addition, the portion of dues paid by a taxpayer
to any member organizations that were attributable to
the expenses of the above activities carried on by such
organization were considered to be deductible
expenses.86 However, deductions for participation or
intervention in political campaigns or in grassroots
lobbying continued to be nondeductible.87
The reasons for effectively overruling the Supreme Court in Cammarano, voiding the Treasury
regulations, and overturning decades of past practice,
are recorded in the legislative history. The legislative
history cites the need for tax parity between expenditures for appearances before the three branches of
government, and the desire to arrive at a true reflection of the taxpayer’s net income for tax purposes:88
It appears anomalous, for example, that expenses
incurred in appearing before legislative bodies or
before legislators are not deductible while
appearances before executive or administrative
officials with respect to administrative matters,
or before the courts with respect to judicial matters, are deductible where the expenses otherwise
qualify as trade or business expenses. Your committee believes that the present bar on deductions
with respect to legislative matters must be modified to place presentations to the legislative
branch of government on substantially the same
footing in this respect as that with the other two
coordinate branches of government.
Congress also emphasized the importance of the
information Congress obtained from those who
lobby legislators:
It also is desirable that taxpayers who have
information bearing on the impact of present
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laws, or proposed legislation, on their trades
or businesses not be discouraged in making
this information available to the Members of
Congress or legislators at other levels of government. The presentation of such information
to the legislators is necessary to a proper evaluation on their part of the impact of present or
proposed legislation. The deduction of such
expenditures on the part of business also is necessary to arrive at a true reflection of their real
income for tax purposes. In many cases making
sure that legislators are aware of the effect of
proposed legislation may be essential to the
very existence of a business.89
Congress denied the deduction for grassroots lobbying, presumably because such lobbying was directed at changing public opinion, but not at providing
information to legislators that legislatures needed
to assess legislation. Similarly, political spending—
from which corporations were still barred at the
time—was explicitly excluded as nondeductible.
The 1963 allowances would remain in place for
thirty years, until the tax treatment of lobbying
expenditures was swept up in the political debate
about campaign finance in the early 1990s. In
1991, Congress considered a bill which included
a proposal for the public financing of elections
through voluntary contributions and the elimination
of the tax deduction for lobbying expenditures that
was vetoed by President George H.W. Bush.90
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There are several explanations for the local exception, which
we elaborate in the next section: (1) path-dependence, (2) the
fact that the disallowance was intended to raise taxes and
curb the influence of ‘‘big business’’ on the Congress; and (3)
the oft-cited legislative rationale that, at the local level, administrative lobbying activities—which are deductible and are not
disallowed by Section 162(e)—are not readily distinguishable
from legislative lobbying. See 30 Highlights and Documents
3648 (Sept. 22, 1993).
86
I.R.C. x 162(e)(1)(B).
87
I.R.C. x 162(e)(2)(A), (B).
88
Id. The Treasury Department opposed Congress’ passage of
the allowance, arguing that it violated the principle of tax neutrality: ‘‘We are not against lobbying. We think lobbying is fine,
the more of it the better, because the representatives of the people know what the country wants. We are only saying that the
Government should not pay for it.’’ Testimony of Secretary of
the Treasury C. Douglas, Hearings on H.R. 10650 Before the
S. Comm. on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4,387 (1962).
89
H.R. Rep. No. 1447 at 17, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. (1962); Sen.
Rep. No. 1881 at 22–23, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. (1962).
90
S. 102d Cong. x 405, 137 Cong. Rec. S6546 (daily ed. May
23, 1991).
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Then, as part of a larger effort at campaign finance
reform, President Bill Clinton, during the 1992
presidential campaign, promised to ‘‘eliminate the
deduction for special interest lobbying expenses.’’91
In his initial State of the Union address, on February 17, 1993, President Clinton reiterated that
promise:
I’m asking Congress to enact real campaign
finance reform. Let’s reduce the power of
special interests and increase the participation of the people. We should end the tax
deduction for special interest lobbying and
use the money to help clean up the political
system. And we should quickly enact legislation to force lobbyists to disclose their
activities.92
Section 162(e) was amended shortly thereafter.
Notwithstanding President Clinton’s desire to
clean up the political process, the legislative history to the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993
identifies increased revenues as the impetus for
repealing the deduction for direct lobbying business expenses. The House Ways and Means
Committee report on the proposed amendment
to Section 162(e) explains that ‘‘[i]n the context
of deficit reduction legislation, it is appropriate
to limit the business deduction for lobbying
expenses.’’93

IV. ANALYSIS
In this Part, we examine the various arguments relating to the tax treatment of direct lobbying expenses.
A. The implicit tax subsidy argument
A persistent argument in the debate has been
that providing business taxpayers with a deduction
for lobbying expenses is the equivalent of providing those taxpayers with a tax subsidy for those
expenditures, and that the only way to provide
for governmental tax neutrality is to disallow any
deduction. This is the position currently taken by
Section 162(e). From a tax perspective, however,
this argument is unfounded, because a tax deduction
for lobbying expenses merely treats such business
expenses on par with other similar expenses of the
taxpayer.

105

As already noted, the Supreme Court in Cammarano expressed concern that providing business taxpayers with a deduction for lobbying expenditures
would provide them with a benefit not available to
non-business taxpayers.94
In the 1963 debates, which ultimately led to the
original provision allowing for the deductibility of
direct lobbying expenses, Senators Paul Douglas
and Albert Gore illustrated the ‘‘tax subsidy’’ argument as follows:
Suppose a measure is being considered, as
many have been, involving a proposed change
in the standards or testing procedures for food,
drugs, or cosmetics. The costs of presenting
the views of drug manufacturers and distributors
would be deductible. The cost of presentations
on behalf of consumers or of disinterested professional or technical advisers would not be.
Or suppose that a State legislature is debating
a measure designed to decrease stream pollution. Manufacturers who would be adversely
affected by its enactment could deduct the
cost of opposition. Members of the public
interested in pure water for drinking or for
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Bill Clinton and Al Gore, Putting People First: How
We Can All Change America 46 (1992).
92
Id.
93
H.R. Rep. No. 103–111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 221, reprinted in 1993-3 C.B. 167, 235 (1993). While most commentators
believe that Section 162(e) was amended primarily to address
budgetary concerns, the Treasury Department explains that
the tax neutrality rationale discussed in Cammarano was
also considered. According to Treasury, a deduction for lobbying expenses ‘‘was inappropriate because it subsidized corporations and special interest groups which intervened in the
legislative process.’’ See Shannon King, The Lobbying Deduction Disallowance: Policy Considerations, Comparisons, and
Structuring Activities Under Amended Section 162(e), 15 Va.
Tax Rev. 551, 558 (1996), citing Department of the
Treasury, Summary of the Administration’s Revenue
Proposals 45 (Feb. 1993); Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the
Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations
After Citizens United, 10 Election L.J. 363, 379 (2011) at
n. 124; Jasper L. Cummings, Tax Policy, Social Policy, and
Politics: Amending Section 162(e), 93 Tax Notes 226-163
(Nov. 3 1993).
Professor Aprill notes that ‘‘Treasury did not explain how
the deduction was inappropriate.’’ Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating
the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organizations
After Citizens United, 10 Election L.J. 363, 379 (2011) at
n. 124.
94
Supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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recreational uses would have to finance their
support of the measure entirely from their
own pockets. Or, at the local level, a business
owner of a piece of real estate could seek
advantageous amendment of the local zoning
ordinance, deducting the cost of his presentation before the local city council. The owners
of nearby residences would not receive this
help from the Federal Treasury in preparing
the exhibits and briefs necessary for effective
opposition.
These are discriminations impossible to justify.95
However, both the Court and the Senators failed
to take into account that business and nonbusiness
taxpayers are not equal in the following respect:
Whereas the benefits that accrue to business
taxpayers from their lobbying activities result,
where successful, in increased income that is subject to tax, nonbusiness taxpayers that achieve
their lobbying goals generally receive nontaxable
benefits. Symmetry results only where businesses
that receive taxable benefits from lobbying
receive offsetting tax deductions, while nonbusiness taxpayers cannot deduct lobbying expenditures where the benefits they receive are not
taxable.
Take, for example, the situation where solar
panel manufacturers lobby Congress to require
utilities to allow solar panel users to feed back
excess electricity generated by clean energy into
the local grid, and to credit those users for the
energy based on a set rate schedule. Solar panel
manufacturers support such legislation because
its passage would increase the sale of their product and, accordingly, result in increased revenues and profits. For those manufacturers, the
increased profits would be subject to tax. Businesses that purchase solar panels would also support such legislation because use of solar panels
would reduce their electricity costs. Again passage of the legislation would increase the taxable
profits of these businesses, which higher profits
would be subject to tax. In both cases, these businesses have increased their current expenses
(through lobbying expenditures) in order to generate future profits. Section 162 of the Internal
Revenue Code generally allows a business taxpayer the ability to offset this additional income
with the costs of earning that income. Lobbying
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expenses should not be treated any differently.
However, under current law, Section 162(e)
denies the business a deduction for these lobbying
costs. Thus, businesses are taxed on the gross
amount of additional income which results from
these lobbying activities while they, in fact,
only receive a net amount of income (i.e., the difference between the increased income earned less
the cost of lobbying for the legislation’s passage).
On the other hand, the benefits resulting to nonbusiness taxpayers from the legislation—lower
utility bills and cleaner air—are not taxable. Current law, correctly, denies the taxpayers that
receive these benefits, on which tax is not
imposed, from deducting the costs that produce
these benefits.96
The prior example illustrates the asymmetry
existing under current law. Business taxpayers are
required to use after-tax dollars in order to generate
pre-tax income. Nonbusiness taxpayers, on the
other hand, use after-tax dollars to create after-tax
benefits. The equal footing desired by the Court
in Cammarano is achieved only through a deduction for business lobbying when taxpayers are
allowed a tax deduction for expenditures that
allow them to generate taxable income, but are
required to spend after-tax dollars to produce
after-tax income or benefits. In that case, each dollar of business profit in the above example could
offset a dollar of business lobbying expense. If Section 162(e) were amended to correspond to this
maxim, lobbying expenses of business taxpayers
would not only be put on the same footing as lobbying expenses of non-business taxpayer, but lobbying
expenses of business taxpayers would be put on the
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Supplemental and Minority Views of Senators Paul Douglas
and Albert Gore, 1962-3 C.B. 1092, 1117.
96
On the other side of the issue, utilities and their customers
without solar panels are both likely to oppose such legislation.
The utilities will sell less energy and will likely pass on some
of the related loss of profits to the consumers, who will therefore face higher utility bills. For these taxpayers, whereas the
utility will generate higher profits (which are subject to tax) if
the legislation does not pass, the consumers will see no difference in their income tax bills if they are successful in keeping
their utility bills lower. The utilities therefore should be able
to offset the higher taxable income with the lobbying cost
that helps to generate that income, while the consumers should
not benefit from a tax deduction where no additional taxable
income results.
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same footing as other business expenses of those
taxpayers.
Finally, as we think about lobbying expenses as
either deductible or not deductible, we recognize
that most commentators start with the proposition
that the federal income tax is a tax on net income.97
Denying a deduction for an amount incurred by a taxpayer in carrying on a trade or business is equivalent
to taxing gross income. And, although Congress
could impose a tax on gross income, our current system does not do so.98 With respect to business taxpayers, Section 162(a) allows for the reduction of gross
business income by all ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on a trade or business. By denying a deduction for lobbying expenses, Section 162(e) sets these
expenses apart from all other ordinary and necessary
business expenses, and distorts the computation of a
business taxpayer’s taxable income.
B. Public policy arguments
The fact that the lobbying disallowance cannot be
justified from a tax perspective means that it must
be grounded in an overriding public policy concern.
What this public policy concern is, however,
remains inarticulate and confused.
Congress advanced a reasoned rationale for
the 1962 legislation: (1) the need for tax parity,
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See David I. Walker, Suitable for Framing, 52 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 1247 (2011), citing Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing
Power: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution 118 (2005); Charles A. Borek, The Public Policy
Doctrine and Tax Logic: The Need for Consistency in Denying
Deductions Arising From Illegal Activities, 22 U. Balt. L.
Rev. 45, 48 (1992). See also Griswold, An Argument Against
the Doctrine that Deductions Should be Narrowly Construed
as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 Harv. L. Rev. 1142,
1147 (1943) (‘‘Taxation on net, not on gross, income has always been the broad basic policy of our income tax laws .
Net income may be defined as what remains out of gross income after subtracting the ordinary and necessary expenses
incurred in efforts to obtain or to keep it,’’ citing McDonald
v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1944) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black).
The Committee Reports that accompanied the 1913 Revenue Act specifically rejected a proposal to limit losses and deductions to those incurred in a legitimate or lawful trade,
noting: ‘‘The object of this bill is to tax a man’s net income;
that is to say, what he has at the end of the year after deducting
from his receipts his expenditures or losses. It is not to reform

107

(2) the unjustifiable distinction between the tax
treatment of administrative and executive lobbying, on the one hand, and legislative lobbying, on
the other hand, and (3) the desirability of receiving
information bearing on the impact of present or
proposed legislation for business taxpayers. On
this basis, Congress narrowly tailored deductions
for direct legislative lobbying at all levels of
state and local government, but expressly denied
such deductions for business spending on political campaigns and grassroots lobbying.99 Excepting political campaigns and grassroots lobbying
makes sense, if one accepts that there is independent value to the information that Congress
receives from business taxpayers through lobbying. In other words, it makes no sense if the only
possible use that can be made of the information
by legislators is to generate policy wins for those
providing it.
The 1993 amendments to Section 162(e), disallowing deductions for direct lobbying at the state
and federal level, but retaining the deduction for
local lobbying, are much less articulate and do not
make the case for such a change.100
The House Report justifies the 1993 revisions to
162(e) as primarily designed to raise revenue.101
But there are practical and jurisprudential problems
with this interpretation. According to projections,
the provision was designed to raise approximate

men’s moral characters; that is not the object of the bill at all.
The tax is not levied for the purpose of restraining people from
betting on horse races or upon ‘‘futures,’’ but the tax is framed
for the purpose of making a man pay upon his net income, his
actual profit during the year. The law does not care where he
got it from, so far as the tax is concerned, although the law
may very properly care in another way.’’ 50 Cong. Rec.
3849 (1913) (remarks of Senator Williams). See also J.S Seidman, Seidman’s Legislative History of f Income Tax
Laws, 1938–1961 at 994–97 (1938).
98
Note, Taxability of Gross Income Under the Sixteenth Amendment, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 274, 282 (1936).
99
Given Congress’s deliberate decision not to overturn the,
then, 100-year old public policy objections to corporate political spending, but to expressly distinguish such precedent with
regard to expensing business lobbying, it becomes clear precisely how extraordinary the Supreme Court’s decision to strike
down a ban on corporate political spending was in the Citizens
United decision.
100
See H.R. Rep. No. 103–213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 111–128
(1993).
101
See, supra, note 54.
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$635 million during the first five years after its
enactment—a modest sum in terms of federal budgeting even twenty years ago.102
But more importantly, it is very rarely justified to
deny a business taxpayer a deduction on public policy grounds. Before 1969, the Internal Revenue
Code itself did not include public policy exceptions
to the deductibility for ordinary and necessary business expenses.103 The ‘‘public policy doctrine’’
developed under common law—until Congress
decided to codify certain exceptions deemed in violation of public policy. The Supreme Court summarized the scope of the public policy doctrine in
Commissioner v. Tellier.104 In that case, the Court
allowed a taxpayer who was engaged in the business of underwriting public stock offerings and
purchasing securities for resale to customers to
deduct legal fees paid to unsuccessfully defend himself against criminal charges in connection with
securities transactions as ‘‘ordinary and necessary’’
business expenses, stating that the public policy

doctrine would apply to prohibit a deduction only
where allowing the deduction would ‘‘frustrate
sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct.’’105 National or
state policies that are frustrated must be ‘‘evidenced
by some governmental declaration of them.’’106
Finally, according to the Court, the ‘‘test on nondeductibility always is the severity and immediacy of
the frustration resulting from allowance of the
deduction.’’107
Congress, of course, is not limited by common
law considerations.108 But the Internal Revenue
Code reflects a similar reluctance to ‘‘mix [business
taxation with] morals and enforcement against nontax pursuits.’’109 As part of the Tax Reform Act of
1969, Congress enacted three provisions pursuant
to which certain ordinary and necessary business
expenditures would be denied a deduction. Section
162(c) denied a deduction for the payment of illegal
bribes, kickbacks, and other illegal amounts. Section 162(f) prevented a taxpayer from deducting
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J. Comm. on Taxation, 103d Cong., Summary of the
Revenue Provisions of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (H.R. 2264), 34 (JCS-11-93) (Aug. 23,
1993).
As with any legislation, the provisions disallowing a deduction for lobbying expenditures went through many iterations
before becoming law. Shortly after his State of the Union
Address, the Treasury Department released a narrative summary of the President’s proposal and estimated that it would
raise approximately $978 million over five years. But see
Staff of the J. Comm. on Taxation, 103d Cong., Estimated Budget Effects of the Administration’s Revenue Proposals Contained in the Fiscal Year 1994
Budget (JCX-2-93) (May 4, 1993) (the Joint Committee estimated that President Clinton’s proposal would raise only
$873 million over the same period).
When the House of Representatives passed a version of the
budget in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
(H.R. 2264), it included a proposal to eliminate the tax deduction for lobbying expenditures estimated to raise approximately $829 million over five years. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at
813 (1993). The Senate passed its own version of the budget,
including a variation of the provision covering lobbying expenses that was broader in scope and more disadvantageous
to business. The Senate’s bill was estimated to raise $1.22 billion over five years. See Senate Comm. on the Budget,
103d Cong., Reconciliation Submissions of the
Instructed Committees Pursuant to the Concurrent
Resolution on the Budget 435 (Comm. Print 1993).
103
S. Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 273 (1968), reprinted
in 1969 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2027, 2310. The
Code did explicitly allow for the deduction of direct lobbying
expenses, overturning the Supreme Court’s public policy doctrine in that respect in Cammarano and Textile Mills.
104
383 U.S. 687 (1966).

Id. at 694, quoting Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467,
473 (1943).
106
Id., quoting Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 97 (1952).
Stanley Surrey has speculated that the reason there were not
more tax penalties was that Congress was ‘‘wary of mixing morals and enforcement against nontax pursuits.’’ See David I.
Walker, Suitable for Framing, 52 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1247,
1259 (2011) (citing Stanley Surrey, Pathways to Tax
Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures 336–37 (1973).
107
Id., quoting Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner, 356 U.S.
30, 35 (1958).
108
See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 693 (1966).
With respect to this point generally, and with respect to lobbying expenditures specifically, the Court has stated:
Deduction of expenses falling within the general definition of s 162(a) may, to be sure, be disallowed by specific
legislation, since deductions ‘are a matter of grace and
Congress can, of course, disallow them as it chooses.’
Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S., at 28, 78 S.Ct. at
514 . The Court has also given effect to a precise and
longstanding Treasury Regulation prohibiting the deduction of a specified category of expenditures; an example
is lobbying expenses, whose nondeductibility was supported by considerations not here present. Textile Mills
Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 62
S.Ct. 272, 86 L.Ed. 249; Cammarano v. United States,
358 U.S. 498, 79 S.Ct. 524, 3 L.Ed.2d 462.
In fact, at the time that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was
enacted, many lobbying and political expenses were nondeductible. However, under the iteration of Section 163(e) that existed
at that time, certain direct lobbying expenses paid or incurred in
connection with carrying on a trade or business were deductible. Supra notes 81–89 and accompanying text.
109
Supra note 107.
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fines or similar penalties paid to a governmental
entity. Section 162(g) disallowed a deduction for
two-thirds of the amount of the treble damages
paid under the antitrust laws. By codifying these narrow and specific public policy allowances, Congress
preempted courts from denying deductions on public
policy grounds.110
In each case, the rationale for prohibiting a
deduction was that a taxpayer should not receive a
tax benefit, or avoid the economic effect of a penalty, for violating a federal or state policy expressly
set forth in a statute. Thus, for example, fines paid
by American Freightways (a trucking company) for
violating a state’s maximum weight laws would not
be deductible as an ordinary and necessary business
expense. Similarly, Wal-Mart should be prohibited
from deducting the payment of bribes to Mexican
government officials to speed up the process of
receiving building permits because such payments
violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
It is certainly hard to see how a revenue raising
measure can be considered an overriding public policy concern. Direct lobbying of the type that we

110

See F. Phillip Manns, Jr., Internal Revenue Code Section
162(f ): When Does the Payment of Damages to a Government
Punish the Payor? 13 Va. Tax Rev. 271, 277 (1993), citing S.
Rep. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 273–76, reprinted in
1969-3 C.B. at 596–98 (‘‘The provision for the denial of the deduction for payments in these situations which are deemed to
violate public policy is intended to be all inclusive. Public policy, in other circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly
defined to justify the disallowance of deductions.’’). As stated,
supra, at note 66, the legislative history also notes that lobbying
expenditures are also covered by tax law.
111
The authors recognize that, by focusing on the legality or illegality of a particular conduct, it is possible that, in light of the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United and its expansive First Amendment jurisprudence in the campaign finance area, to argue that expenses for grassroots lobbying and
political spending by businesses should also be deductible. To do
so is beyond the scope of this Article. We do note, however, that
prior to this body of law, most of the activities covered by Section
162(e), with the exception of Section 162(e)(1)(A), were prohibited under federal and/or state campaign finance laws.
112
In this context, it is noteworthy that provisions enacted into the
tax code to effect taxpayer behavior often have the opposite effect.
A connection can be drawn between Section 162(e) and Section
162(m), which was also enacted as part of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 in this regard. Congress enacted Section
162(m) in an attempt to deal with the perceived problem of excessive executive compensation. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, x 13211(a), 107 Stat. 312, 469–
71. The legislative history states that Section 162(m) was motivated by concerns regarding the amount of executive compensation
paid by public companies, and that the provision was intended
to reduce excessive compensation. See Staff of J. Comm. on
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argue should be deductible—lobbying coupled
with public disclosure of potentially valuable information upon which legislators and the citizenry can
base their views—is neither expressly nor implicitly
prohibited by any federal or state statute. While
the courts, and many others, have long disfavored
the idea of business, and in particular, corporate lobbying, such lobbying activities are decidedly not
illegal in the same manner as the items that provide
for a disallowance of deductions in Sections 162(c),
(f), and (g).111
To the extent that Section 162(e) was amended
in 1993 to reduce business lobbying—which
the Clinton Treasury described as ‘‘inappropriate
because it subsidized corporations and special interest
groups which intervened in the legislative process’’—
current law reflects a public policy that is in direct
contradiction with the intent to increase legislative
lobbying by businesses under the 1962 amendments.112 And yet, neither the Clinton Treasury,
nor the legislative history, explain why such lobbying is deemed inappropriate. In its 1993 legislative
brief, the Clinton Treasury simply falls back on the

Taxation, 109TH Cong., Present Law and Background
Relating to Executive Compensation 6 (Comm. Print
2006). This provision generally disallows a tax deduction for compensation paid to certain executives of publicly held corporations
in excess of $1 million unless such compensation is based on performance.
Both Section 162(e) and Section 162(m) were enacted to
address similar public policy issues. Section 162(m) was
expected to address the agency problem in publicly traded
companies. Simply put, where a publicly traded corporation
does not have a controlling shareholder, there is a concern
that the top corporate executives ‘‘have almost complete
discretion in management.’’ See Lucian A. Bebchuk and
Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, 17 J. of Econ. Perspectives 71 (2003), citing
Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, The
Modern Corporation and Private Property 139
(1932). Where such an agency problem exists, Professors
Bebchuk and Fried have argued that executive compensation is inefficient and excessive. Bebchuk and Fried,
Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise
of Executive Compensation (2004). For a discussion of
these arguments and opposing arguments, see Stuart Lazar, The
Unreasonable Case for a Reasonable Compensation Standard
in the Public Company Context: Why It Is Unreasonable to Insist
on Reasonableness, 59 Buff. L. Rev. 937, 944–952 (2011).
Their ‘‘managerial power’’ theory states that compensation paid
to corporate executives have often ‘‘deviated from arm’s-length
contracting because directors have been influenced by management, sympathetic to executives, insufficiently motivated to bargain over compensation, or simply ineffectual in overseeing
compensation.’’ Bebchuk and Fried at 4.
(Continued)
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Supreme Court’s reasoning based on tax parity in
Cammarano and on Cammarano’s general denunciation of lobbying, without giving any serious
attention to the 1962 legislative history addressing
this issue, or any of the voluminous political science literature on legislative lobbying as an information subsidy accumulated up until that time.
This stands in stark contrast to the detailed debate
and analysis of the effects of the legislation passed
by the Congress in 1963.
The presumption is that lobbying, and the lobbying deduction, distort the political process in favor
of ‘‘special interests,’’ as stated by President Clinton. Clinton called for eliminating the deduction as
part of a package of campaign finance reforms that
would ‘‘reduce the power of special interests and
increase the participation of the people.’’113 But by
treating direct lobbying the same as political spending, the 1993 amendments undercut the reasoned distinction between influencing elections and public
opinion, on the one hand, and providing direct lobbying, on the other hand, that the Congress made in
1962. The present statute does not in any way contemplate the desirability of providing Congress
with information and equates informing and educating Congress with political spending.
In the following Part, we argue that the 87th Congress and the 111th Congress both had it right—but
only in part.

(footnote 112 continued.) In his first State of the Union Address,
President Clinton stated that one of his goals in pushing for the
end of the tax deduction for ‘‘special interest lobbying’’ was a desire to ‘‘reduce the power of special interests and increase the participation of the people.’’ See, supra, note 91. President Clinton’s
concern about increasing the participation of the people has a
similar tone to that of Professors Bebchuk and Fried in granting
more power to the shareholders—providing a feeling that Section
162(e) and Section 162(m) were designed to combat similar
agency problems. Section 162(m) was created to prevent corporate officers from taking a tax deduction when they set their own
salary in situations that might be in conflict with their shareholders; Section 162(e) was enacted to prevent business taxpayers
from deducting expenses incurred in lobbying the legislature in
situations in which those taxpayers are involved influencing the
creation of legislation from which they will benefit.
Whether caused by the passage of tax legislation, the result has
been the same. Numerous commentators have noted that Section
162(m) has had the unintended consequence of increasing executive compensation at publicly held corporations. See Lazar, at
985. While there is no similar suggestion that Section 162(e)
has increased the amount of money being spent on lobbying,
there is certainly no suggestion that there is less money being devoted to lobbying in 2013 than there was in 1993.
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V. INFORMATION AS A PUBLIC GOOD
Members of Congress, who labor under evergreater demands on their time and resources,114
continue to view lobbyists as invaluable resources
who provide them with costly policy information,
political intelligence, and support.115 This is consistent with ‘‘a growing research consensus’’ which
focuses on the roles of lobbyists ‘‘in providing information and [.] technical expertise in affecting the
terms of a policy debate and the reactions of decision
makers to the appeals of advocates.’’116 As Richard
Briffault notes, lobbying advises legislators about
conditions in particular industries, geographic areas,
or socio-economic groups; the costs and benefits of
proposed laws and regulations; the consequences of
the government actions under consideration; and the
views of those affected by potential government decisions.117 Moreover, this information is important both
for legislation and congressional oversight of the federal bureaucracy.118
Uncritical versions of the information subsidy
theory conclude prematurely that lobbyists thereby
provide a collective or public good. Some political
scientists have argued that the information conveyed
by lobbyists—information that is not otherwise available to the government—can improve the government
decision process, thereby improving welfare.119 After
all, information has public goods characteristics in
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that, once disclosed, anyone can make use of the information for their own purposes.120 Lobbying could
thus generate positive externalities or spillover
effects.121 The 87th Congress appears to have based
the deduction for direct lobbying, at least in part, on
the view that the information provided by lobbyists
helps Congress, as a whole, do a better job.122 The
view that lobbying provides such an informational
public good prevails among many legislators, professionals, and scholars.123 Moreover, even sophisticated
analyses slide back into language that can easily be
misread in this way.124 At the naı̈ve extreme, however,
such a view fails to consider the nature of the information that is provided, to whom it is provided, how, and
in what institutional settings.
A substantial portion of the political science literature—descriptive, empirical, and formal—has
attended to precisely these questions.125 A widely
accepted articulation of the ‘‘legislative subsidy theory’’ by Hall and Deardorff, for example, argues
that lobbying operates as ‘‘a matching grant’’ of
costly information and resources to ‘‘the enterprises
of strategically selected legislators.’’126 Lobbyists
do provide critical policy (and other) information
to legislators, but primarily to legislators who
already agree with them.127 ‘‘The proximate objective of this strategy is not to change legislators’
minds but to assist natural allies in achieving their
own, coincident objectives.’’128 While this makes
it look as if the likeminded legislators were working
on behalf of the lobbyists’ client or interest group, in
fact, the legislators are working on behalf of themselves.129
Hall and Deardorff provide an alternative to the
popular view that lobbyists succeed by pressuring
legislators to do their bidding (the ‘‘persuasion theory’’), or that they can ‘‘buy’’ votes by making campaign contributions (the ‘‘exchange theory’’).130
But, in so doing, Hall and Deardorff (and this literature in general) also call into question the simple
view that business lobbying provides an informational public good.
It is not merely, as Hall and Deardorff themselves
point out, that ‘‘subsidies help legislators to work
harder primarily on behalf of the interest that can
afford the high costs,’’ that is, the business groups
which exhibit a tremendous predominance and
imbalance of financial resources in federal lobbying.131 Whatever else it does, business lobbying
does provide critical information and policy expertise to legislators. Critical information about mar-
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kets and industry remains critical information, even
if resources are lacking to support non-business
interests.132
What the literature shows, but does not always
recognize explicitly, is that information asymmetries
and the strategic use of information distort and
undermine the value of such information—even
assuming that it is all ‘‘good information’’ in the
nature of policy expertise, datasets, and scientific
analyses that business interests and their lobbyists
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are providing.133 The information asymmetry
between legislators and lobbying interests, which is
widely recognized in the literature,134 leads to
moral hazard. Legislators have limited time and
resources to understand or verify the accuracy of
the information provided. Business (and other) interests can thus act opportunistically by providing information selectively, or framing complex empirical
evidence by self-serving interpretation. Knowing
this, legislators will discount valuable information
so provided, because they will not be able to assess
the quality of the information.
One practical solution to this information
asymmetry problem is a type of reputational
bonding.135 Experienced professionals assert that
a lobbyist who provides bad or even deceptive
information will be excluded from the process permanently.136 This supports the information subsidy
theory. But it raises further problems. It suggests
that legislators will discount information that is not
provided through such lobbyists—like, for example,
information coming directly from businesses and
corporations—because such information is not
bonded in this immediate fashion. And this curious
fact, which flies in the face of popular theories of
the dominance of business interests, is, in fact,
observed.137
Other internal mechanisms exist to overcome
this information asymmetry problem. Recall that
lobbyists do not publicly disclose the information they receive, but provide it to strategically
selected legislators.138 These legislators, referred
to as ‘‘legislative entrepreneurs’’ (LEs) in the literature, specialize in a particular policy area and
commit their resources to providing their information and policy expertise to other legislators.139
Such LE’s either already occupy leading positions
on committees and subcommittees, or are motivated by rising in the congressional ranks.140 As
a result of greater specialization, such LEs and
their staff will be in a better position to assess the
value of the information that they receive from
businesses and their lobbyists. But this only gives
rise to a second set of information asymmetries
between LEs and other legislators leading to similar problems. The other legislators, including those
with policy expertise in other areas, rely upon the
LE’s expertise in collecting, filtering, and assembling such information in their particular area of
expertise.141 To the extent that LE’s have their
own (personal and policy) goals, their opportunis-
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tic behavior will include managing information
strategically.142 Such behavior includes withholding information (in whole or in part), delaying or
timing information disclosure to prevent others
from making independent use or being able to adequately digest and respond to the information, and
structuring legislative debates to avoid certain
arguments or make these arguments more difficult
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for their opponents to make.143 Such behavior need
not be viewed as unprofessional or unethical, but—to
the extent it remains within the rules of the game—a
valid tactic to promote ones interests and frame
issues for decision in an adversarial system or negotiation. In an adversarial system (or a negotiation) it
is the role of the adversary (or counterparty) to make
their case.
These are just some of the problems with the
assumption of frictionlessness that underlies the
view that information provided to Congress through
lobbying somehow produces positive externalities
and ends up serving the ‘‘public interest.’’

VI. POLICY PROPOSAL
The standard response to the information problems of imperfect markets is regulation and, in
particular, regulation that increases the ready availability of good information.144 One example is the
securities disclosure regime that was established
as part of the second wave of New Deal regulation.
These disclosure regimes generally require the disclosure of information both to government officials
and directly to consumers. Since the rise of the modern administrative state in the 1930s, disclosure
regimes have become a critical and pervasive strategy of public and private lawmaking. Over time,
disclosure regimes and information transparency
rules have become central to the U.S. regulation
of the financial markets, public health, public safety,
labor relations, labor conditions, the environment,
government integrity, and elections.
To date, however, almost no consideration has
been given to address the information asymmetries
of lobbying by regulating the scope, tools, and timing of the substantive information and expertise that
businesses and their lobbyists provide Congress.
There is no requirement or standard for publishing
the substance of any information, data, or policy
analysis that lobbying provides to legislators or congressional committees. This is not merely true for
information that lobbyists share with individual legislators in private meetings. But it also includes their
reviews of proposed legislation, proposals for new
federal programs or activities, written testimony
and materials submitted to congressional committees, pre-introduction research undertaken by various
individuals and groups to ensure that a proposed bill
avoids unintended consequences, and private com-

113

munications with committee members and staff
before and during markup, and with House-Senate
conference committee members and staff.145
Many of these substantive communications about
legislative matters proceed in secrecy. Unlike the
administrative comment process, there are almost
no rules governing this type of input into the development of legislation. The requirements for disclosing
any of this information are limited. Indeed, congressional committees are entitled to draft and mark up
legislation relying entirely on this type of ex parte
communication, given that there is no requirement
that legislation (other than annual budget resolutions)
be drafted, in whole or in part, based on hearing testimony. Current lobbying regulations require only
lobbyist registration, the disclosure of their clients,
the moneys spent on lobbying, a very limited identification of the issues of lobbying concern, and similar
information. But such regulation does not target the
information problems described above.
If the information that lobbying supplies is
critical to lawmaking—and there is good reason to believe so146—then such lobbying should
be encouraged, and the information should be
treated as the valuable resource that it is.147
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As one of the most experienced lobbyists in
Washington, DC notes:
If the public’s true concern is asymmetry in
the system, where some moneyed interests
have more lobbying clout, then the answer is
to endeavor to afford the underrepresented
more lobbying clout. Contrary to conventional
wisdom, the counterintuitive solution to the
problem of undue influence is more lobbying,
not less. Instead of trying to limit the use of
expert advocacy, we should find ways to give
the less advantaged a louder voice in the legislative and regulatory processes. Universal
access to lobbying provides a check on special
access and unfair influence and helps to hold
lawmakers accountable. Thus, rather than
determining ways to restrict lobbying, we
should consider ways to increase access to
public policy advocacy.148
We therefore propose that businesses should be
encouraged to provide information to Congress,
but only if the information is publicly disclosed in
a timely fashion. Not just hearing testimony, but
all communications about the substance of a bill
with legislators, their staff, and committee staff,
should be deductible, so long as the information is
disclosed publicly. Activities such as grassroots lobbying, election spending (including the type of issue
advertising that the McCain-Feingold Bill defined
as ‘‘electioneering communications’’ before the
Supreme Court eviscerated the category) should
not be deductible.149 In short, we believe that
some portion of the version of Section 162(e),
allowing for a deduction for oral and written testimony submitted to a legislative body, should be
reinstated provided that such information is publicly
disclosed so that its value can be used by all.
How should such information be disclosed?
Ideally, the Library of Congress or the Congressional Research Service would create a database
similar to the ‘‘JAMES system’’ that Lee Drutman
has proposed in a publication by The Brookings
Institution. Drutman conceived of it as a supplement
to the current THOMAS System (found at < http://
thomas.loc.gov > ), which makes legislation available online every time a bill is introduced. The
JAMES system, however, would function as a
kind of ‘‘modern variation on notice-and-comment
rulemaking for the legislative process,’’ providing
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a web-based ‘‘forum for lobbyists, constituents,
and other interested parties to publicly and transparently debate legislation and, in the process, provide
congressional staff, journalists, and the public
access to the best available arguments, information,
and ideas about public policy—all in a way that is
easily searchable and sortable.’’150 Different users
would use the system differently. Lobbyists would
be required to disclose whom they are advocating
for. Members of Congress would be entitled to
post pages that make the case for a particular bill.
The system would also provide a tool for legislators
to manage their constituency input in a more sophisticated manner.151 A public online forum would be
able to aggregate, rank, and escalate comments by
individuals.
The many problems associated with such online
systems of information management would require
careful development based on existing forums such
as Wikipedia, using advanced non-SQL languages
pioneered by Facebook and Google.152 These details
are beyond the scope of this article.
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How would such publication mitigate current
information asymmetry and adverse selection problems? Critical information would become available
to all legislators and outside groups. Real-time, online
publication would create a forum where such information can be readily vetted, countered, simplified,
and considered in its implications by others (including opposing interest groups, academics, the executive, administrative agencies, individuals, and small
businesses). This would make it harder to deploy
information strategically during the process.
Will the publication of industry specific information and data merely overwhelm the public? Professor Lessig has made a similar argument with regard
to the financial disclosure of lobbying activities,153
and concludes that ‘‘[n]ot only does the ‘information’ revealed not necessarily inform, but the most
important influences in the system would not necessarily be revealed.’’154 There are a number of
responses to this question. First, and foremost, the
disclosure of written lobbying communications is
not primarily intended to reveal who influences
whom—although it will enhance this type of disclosure as well—but to make public substantive lobbying information so as to increase the public benefit
of such information and decrease its private benefits. Second, we cannot see any benefit that accrues
to the public from keeping such information secret,
given that legislators, who are lobbied, already
use it in the legislative process. Third, the broader,
educated public generally relies on intermediaries,
including journalists, bloggers, professional associations, public interest groups, think tanks, other
lobbyists, and academic experts to play an important role in making sense of complex data and public policy information. Especially at the federal
level, where legislation has significant consequences nationwide, there are almost always sophisticated coalitions of interests on both sides of any
issue.155 Thus Lessig’s critique of a more limited
financial transparency is also unfair because neither journalists nor the broader public need to analyze lists of contributors and their donations by
themselves. Intermediaries, like the Center for
Responsive Politics’ database and website OpenSecrets.org, have specialized in organizing, maintaining, and analyzing such data.
But why give businesses a tax break to do something they do anyway, that is, spend billions of
dollars lobbying Congress? As already noted, it
is the right thing to do from a tax standpoint. If
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corporations are spending these dollars, proper
tax accounting should allow them to offset those
expenses against their revenue in determining taxable income. These and other arguments from a tax
perspective have been addressed in the previous
section.
Moreover, the assumption that the lobbying
deduction would not change behavior is just
that. First, we are not arguing that a tax deduction
would encourage the creation of more information. Rather, the tax deduction would encourage
businesses and their lobbyists to publicize the substantive information they provide legislators—
something they currently do not do. They would
thus come closer to actually providing an informational public good.
Second, such a tax deduction for direct lobbying
may also encourage more small and medium-sized
business owners to participate more directly in providing information to Congress. The difference
between a deductible and an out-of-pocket expense
to attend a congressional hearing may make a difference to these parties currently underrepresented in
the process.
Finally, regardless of the deductibility or nondeductibility of any particular lobbying expenditure,
the money will likely be spent in Washington in
any case. But if businesses and their lobbyists can
spend it on something that is deductible, as opposed
to something that is not, they are likely to choose the
type of spending they can expense. Jasper Cummings has suggested that when Congress took
away the deduction for direct lobbying, it may
have shifted some of that money to other activities.
Not allowing the deduction does not draw these
expenditures out of the system. It may, however,
mean that this money will go to expenditures, such
as grassroots lobbying or campaign expenditures
which are much more controversial (and which
have never been deductible).
Why not simply legislate lobbying disclosure
rules for substantive information? Our proposal
reflects a compromise. Tying tax breaks for business
to disclosure of substantive lobbying information
may have a better chance of passage than a mandate
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or other proposed lobbying reforms. It alters the
choice architecture of business lobbying to encourage routine disclosure of written lobbying communications; and it puts the management of written
lobbying communications via an online transparency and information system like Lee Drutman’s
‘‘JAMES’’ system back on the table.
Moreover, relying on a tax deduction to channel
information avoids running into First Amendment
problems. The political speech of lobbyists and
their clients would not be burdened by refusing
them a tax deduction under these circumstances.
This is not to say that we would discourage the
amendment of Senate and House rules to confer
responsibility on legislators, committees, and staffers to ensure that outside information is made available online just like the federal courts now use the
PACER system for all court filings and judicial
orders. Indeed, Congress has a great interest in
such transparency reforms, given the record levels
of public distrust it currently engenders.156
Why can’t legislators turn to government (administrative agencies, the Congressional Research
Service) to supply the relevant expertise? Why not
simply increase each legislator’s legislative staff?
Legislators do rely heavily on information provided
by executive agencies, but government cannot provide its own feedback. Different sources produce
different substantive information. Large reinsurers,
for example, will have unparalleled insight into
how a tax provision might impact the national reinsurance markets. Moreover, to the extent that legislators lack a clear understanding, it is the private
reinsurers who have a compelling incentive, the necessary resources, and the best access to the data, to
generate substantive information about the issue in
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a timely manner. Moreover, the information is not
just available for free in the public domain. In the
private sector, good information is generally proprietary, costly, and not freely shared with others.157

VII. CONCLUSION
We recognize that the proposed policy does not
address all problems associated with the distortion
of the legislative process by large moneyed interests. It is a limited, incremental change that we
believe is more feasible politically, than other
wholesale reforms, such as the American Bar Association’s proposed lobbying reforms. Unlike the
focus on curbing money in politics, it recognizes
the reality that all participants in the process
observe: namely, that legislators depend on the
costly information that lobbying and lobbyists provide. With this information already part of the system, bringing such information to light only can
help improve the legislative process.
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